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Abstract
This paper studies the design of pension benefits and contributions when an individ-
ual’s health status (disutility of continued activity) is endogenous and depends on his
consumption of health services. Health services can be subsidized (in a linear or non
linear way, depending on the information structure). Uniform public provision of health
services is also considered. We show that like with exogenous health status, the second-
best policy may induce early retirement for some types of individuals. Furthermore,
whatever the specific information structure considered (individual levels or anonymous
transactions) for health services, a subsidization of health expenditures obtains under
fairly plausible assumptions. Third, when the information structure permits only lin-
ear subsidies, the case for uniform public provision of health services (which can be
supplemented but not resold) appears to be quite strong.
1 Introduction
Over the last decade the future of pension systems has been a widely debated issue. The
challenges posed by the ongoing process of demographic ageing are by now understood.
However, aging is only part of the story. The generalized decrease of entry ages into
retirement is also a significant problem. There are a number of explanations for this
trend. The dominant one is the implicit taxation on continued activity of elderly workers.
This argument is based on the idea that workers have, individually or collectively, a
large degree of discretion concerning retirement age. In that line, Gruber and Wise
(1999, 2002) have shown for a dozen of OECD countries that households often face very
powerful financial incentives pushing them to retire early.
However early retirement policies that come from various sources, early retirement
programs but also unemployment and disability insurance schemes, cannot be easily
abandoned. They also serve the objective of helping those who are unable to work long
because of disability or don’t want to work long because of low productivity. Unfortu-
nately, these redistribution and insurance objectives cannot be easily fulfilled because
productivity and health are typically not observable. It is thus important to design
a system of retirement and disability insurance which takes those informational con-
straints into account. Our earlier papers Cremer et al (2004a—c) have studied this
problem under specific assumptions. They have shown that the optimal second best
policy may imply distortions like early retirement or exit from the labor force of healthy
workers through disability insurance schemes. While these papers consider settings in
which individuals differ in “health status”, they have considered this source of hetero-
geneity as purely exogenous.1 However, in reality an individual’s health status may
be, at least in part, endogenous. In particular it may be affected by his consumption
of health services. This additional ramification brings about a number of interesting
questions. First, one may wonder whether the results obtained with exogenous health
1 In Cremer et al. (2004a), health status (along with other adverse selection variables like productiv-
ity) is not obsevrable. The possibility of costly heatlh testing (auditing) is considered in Cremer et al.
(2004b). Cremer et al. (2004c) explicitly introduce the distinction between disabled individuals on the
one hand, and leisure prone individuals, on the other hand. While both of these two types of individuals
have a hight disutility of labor, they may not be accounted for in the same way in social preferences.
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stand in such a more general setting. Second, there is the issue of public intervention
in the health sector. Specifically, should public policy interfere with individuals’ choice
of health service consumption (through subsidization or public provision)? Third, there
is the more fundamental question of whether extra resources should be expended to
make individuals more “equal” or whether it is more appropriate to use this money to
compensate the less healthy individuals.2
This paper addresses these questions by studying the design of a social security
scheme which can be supplemented by health policies including subsidization of health
expenditures and public provision of health care. We consider a setting where agents
differ both in their productivity and in their health status. The health status determines
the disutility of intensive (work week) and extensive (career length) work. Additionally,
it is also affected by health expenditures. Thus, an increase in health expenditures
can lower the disutility of work. Social preferences are assumed to be utilitarian and
neither the health status nor the productivity of individuals are publicly observable. The
optimal policy is represented by a tax/transfer function which depends on labor income,
the age of retirement and the health expenditures (if observable). We first present the
optimum when the government can observe individuals’ health expenditures and then
turn to the case where health expenditures are anonymous transactions. Finally, we
consider the case for public provision of health services as additional instrument which
is used along with an optimal tax policy.
2 The model
The model we use is a reduced form of an intertemporal model. It is inspired by the
specification used in Cremer et al. (2004a) who also discuss its micro foundations.3
Consider an individual whose length of life is normalized at 1 and whose consumption
level, c, is constant over time. His labor supply is constant at level l up to z (with
0 ≤ z ≤ 1) and equal to zero afterwards. For concreteness we shall often refer to l
2A similar issue arises when individuals earning ability (productivity) depends on their education;
see e.g., Cremer and Pestieau (2004) and Maldonado (2004).
3Monotonicity conditions are also discussed in detail there. We only recall those which are directly
relevant for the problem considered here.
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as “weekly labor supply” while z is interpreted as “retirement age”. Preferences are
represented by the following (reduced form) utility function
u(c)− V (l)R(z,H). (1)
The function R (z,H) denotes the disutility for a working life of length z with Rz > 0
and Rzz > 0.4 Labor disutility, regarding the length of working life z, can be interpreted
in terms of an indicator of health status. Healthy individuals accordingly would have a
lower R than individuals whose poor health makes it harder to work beyond a certain
age. An individual’s health status also depends on his consumption of health services
H ≥ 0, where RH < 0 and RHH > 0. The producer prices of health services is constant
and normalized at 1. There is another term in the labor disutility which concerns the
length of work week, V (l).5 In the laissez-faire an individual’s budget constraint is given
by c+H = D = zwl where D is the disposable income.
Individuals differ in their productivity, w and in their health status R. For simplicity
we consider only two types of individuals, indexed i = 1, 2, with w2 ≥ w1, R2(z,H) ≤
R1(z,H) for all z ∈ [0, 1] and H ≥ 0. In words, type 2 is the “good” type who is both
more productive and more healthy (his disutility of continued activity is smaller).6
Some of our results below rely on a more specific assumption:
Assumption 1 We have (i) R2z(z,H) ≤ R1z(z,H) and (ii) R1H (z,H) ≤ R2H (z,H) for
all z ∈ [0, 1] and H ≥ 0.
The first of these conditions states that type 2’s disutility of continued activity
4Unless otherwise stipulated, subsripts stand for partial derivatives.
5As discussed by Cremer et al. (2004) the reduced form function (1) can be obtained under some
assumptions from the maximization of lifetime utility with an instantaneous utility function
U (t) = u (c (t))− r(t,H)V (l (t)) .
For instance, when c(t) is constant (interest rate equal rate of time preference) and when we set l(t) = l
for t ≤ z and 0 afterwards, we can define
R(z,H) =
Z z
0
r(t,H)dt.
6We assume that the term V (l) is the same for everyone. When returning to the micro founda-
tions discussed in footnote 5 one can easily show that this assumption does not impose any additional
restrictions. Any heterogenity in labor disutlity can be subsumed in r(t,H).
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which by definition is smaller than that of type 1, also increases at a lower rate. To
interpret (ii), recall that RH < 0. It is therefore convenient to rewrite the condition
in terms of positive numbers yielding −R1H (z,H) ≥ −R2H (z,H). Assumption 1 (ii)
thus states that (for given retirement age and health expenditure), an increase in health
expenditures induces a larger reduction in R for the individual with the poorer health
(namely individual 1).
Throughout the paper we shall assume that an individual’s (“weekly”) income
y = wl, and the retirement age z are observable while w, l and R are not observable.
Neglecting H for the time being, the tax cum retirement policy can be summarized in
a net tax-transfer function T (y, z) which depends on the observable variables. We have
studied the design of this function in Cremer et al. (2004a). Specifically, we have exam-
ined whether the retirement decision (choice of z) ought to be distorted in a second best
setting; i.e., whether it is desirable to impose a so called “implicit tax on continued ac-
tivity”. In the current paper we continue to assume that the tax and retirement policies
are designed in a optimal way but we concentrate on the public policies involving health
services. We shall examine whether the optimal policy mix ought to include a subsidy
of health expenditures or possibly a public provision of health services. We look at this
issue under two informational assumptions. First, we assume that individual consump-
tion levels of health services are publicly observable. In that case, subsidies of health
expenditures can take a very general form. In particular they can be nonlinear and con-
ditional on income (means tested). Then, we assume that only anonymous transactions
are observable so that only linear subsidies on health expenditures are available.7
3 Publicly observable personal consumption of health ser-
vices
3.1 Policy instruments and individual choices
When H is observable at the individual level, it can be used as an argument in the
net transfer function T (y, z,H). Now this function specifies not only the individual
7For a more detailed discussion of the impact of the information structure on the set of feasible
instruments, see Cremer and Gahvari (1997).
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retirement benefits (net of payroll taxes) but also any (positive or negative) subsidy
of health expenditures. With such a transfer function individuals solve the following
problem:
Max
c,z,l,H
u(c)− V ( y
w
)R(z,H) (2)
s.t. : c = zy −H − T (y, z,H) (3)
Substituting (3) into (2) and differentiating with respect to the remaining variables
yields the following first-order conditions with respect to y, z, and H:
w (z − Ty)u0(c)− V 0(l)R(z,H) = 0 (4)
(y − Tz)u0(c)− V (l)Rz(z,H) = 0 (5)
−(1 + TH)u0(c)− V (l)RH(z,H) = 0 (6)
Observe that by setting T (y, z,H) ≡ 0 (so that Ty = Tz = TH = 0) we obtain the laissez-
faire solution at which individuals’ choices are not distorted. Since we are interested
in the determination of z, H and the interaction between H and z, we concentrate on
equations (6) and (5) which can be rewritten as follows:
MRScz =
V (l)Rz(z,H)
u0(c)
= y − Tz (7)
MRScH = −
V (l)RH(z,H)
u0(c)
= (1 + TH), (8)
MRSHz = −
Rz(z,H)
RH(z,H)
= y
"
1− Tzy
1 + TH
#
= y [1− θ] (9)
where MRScz is the marginal rate of substitution between z and c and MRScH is the
marginal rate of substitution between H and c (i.e. the slope of an indifference curve in
the (H, c) space). Similarly, MRSHz is the marginal rate of substitution in the (z,H)
space while θ is defined as
θ =
TH + Tzy
1 + TH
Not surprisingly, condition (8) states that the marginal rate of substitution between
H and the numeraire be equal to the net marginal price of H, i.e., the producer price
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minus or plus any subsidy or tax. When TH < 0 we have a marginal subsidy and the
net price of H is less than 1. Similarly, from (7), there is a marginal tax on continued
activity when Tz > 0.
Equation (9) describes the tradeoff between health expenditures and retirement age.
This is understood most easily by looking at the “effort minimization” problem. This
is the “dual” problem of utility maximization in the sense that to maximize utility
(2) subject to the budget constraint (3) it is necessary to minimize “effort” defined by
E = V (l)R (z,H) for a given level I of life-cycle income net of health expenditures
(i.e., subject to I = wlz − T (y, z) − pH, where I is exogenously given and set at the
appropriate level). This problem is represented on Figure 1 in the (z,H) space for a
given level of y. The solution is a point of tangency between an “iso-effort curve” and
the income constraint. When there are no taxes or subsidies, (Tz = TH = 0) the slope
of the income constraint is y. When marginal tax rates are not zero, the slope equals
y(1− θ). When θ < 0 (i.e. when the subsidy on health, −TH exceed Tz/y) the slope is
larger than y and H is encouraged with respect to z. A positive θ on the other hand
implies a distortion in favor of z.8
An alternative view on these distortions consists in saying that the choice between H
and z is distorted upward (θ < 0) if individuals who increase their health expenditures
pay less taxes, for a given level of before tax lifetime income I = yz−H (i.e., when z is
determined by z = (I +H)/y) and a given y. Denoting TT (H) = T (y, (I +H)/y,H)
the total tax paid by an individual, this variation is given by
dTT (H)
dH
= TH +
Tz
y
(10)
which has the same sign of θ.
3.2 Second best optimum
We proceed by characterizing the (utilitarian) Pareto efficient allocation constrained
by the information structure. Denoting f i the proportion of type i individual, the
Lagrangian expression associated with this problem is given by
8The distortions mentioned here are substitution effects, for given levels of I.
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Figure 1: Effort minimization and distortions in the (z,H) space.
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max
ci,yi,zi,Hi
X
i
f iU i + µ
ÃX
f i
i
¡
yizi − ci −Hi
¢!
+λ
µ
u(c2)− V ( y
2
w2
)R2(z2,H2)− u(c1) + V ( y
1
w2
)R2(z1,H1)
¶
, (11)
where µ > 0 is the multiplier of the resource constraint, while λ is the multiplier asso-
ciated with the “downward” self-selection constraint (from the productive and healthy
type 2 to the less productive and less healthy type 1). As usual in utilitarian case,
this downward incentive constraint is necessarily binding so that we have λ > 0. The
first-order conditions with respect to ci, zi,Hi (i = 1, 2) are given by
f1u0(c1)− µf1 − λu0(c1) = 0, (12)
f2u0(c2)− µf2 + λu0(c2) = 0, (13)
− f1V (l1)R1z(z1,H1) + µf1y1 + λV (
_
l
2
)R2z(z
1,H1) = 0, (14)
− f1V (l2)R2z(z2,H2) + µf2y2 − λV (l2)R2z(z2,H2) = 0, (15)
− f1V (l1)R1H(z1,H1)− µf1 + λV (
_
l
2
)R2H(z
1,H1) = 0, (16)
− f1V (l2)R1H(z1,H1)− µf2 − λV (l2)R2H(z2,H2) = 0, (17)
where
_
l
2
= y1/w2 is the (weekly) labor supply of the “mimicking” individual.9
Combining (13) and (17) yields MRS2cH = 1, which along with (8) implies T
2
H = 0:
there is no subsidy (or tax) on individual 2’s consumption of health services. This is
the usual “no distortion at the top result”, which of course also applies to z and y.
For individual 1, combining (12) and (14) yields
MRS1cz = y1

 f
1 − λ
f1 − λMRS
2
cz
MRS1cz

 , (18)
where
MRS
2
cz
MRS1cz
=
V
µ_
l
2
¶
R2z(z
1,H1)
V (l1)R1z(z1,H1)
< 1.
9The solution must of course also satisfy the first-order conditions with respect to yi.We have omitted
these expressions because we make no explicit use of them in our subsequent arguments.
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This implies MRS1cz < y1 so that there is a marginal downward distortion in the
retirement age. In other words, and making use of equation (7), the marginal tax on
the age of retirement, Tz, is positive. Consequently, it appears that the main result
of Cremer et al˙. (2004) continues to hold when the disutility of continued activity is
endogenous and depends on the consumption of health services.
Equivalently, combining (12) and (16) yields
MRS1cH =

 f
1 − λ
f1 − λMRS
2
cH
MRS1cH

 , (19)
where
MRS
2
cH
MRS1cH
=
V
µ_
l
2
¶
R2H(z
1,H1)
V (l1)R1H(z
1,H1)
. (20)
From the comparison of (19) and (8), it follows that the sign of T 1H depends on whether
MRS1cH is smaller of larger than one. To examine this we start by studying the RHS
of (20). With w2 ≥ w1 we have V (
_
l
2
) ≤ V
¡
l2
¢
. Furthermore, Assumption 1 implies
R2H(z
1,H1) ≤ R1H(z1,H1).10 Consequently we have
MRS
2
cH
MRS1cH
≤ 1,
which from (19) implies MRS1cH ≥ y and thus T 1H ≤ 0. Observe that to obtain a
strict inequality it is sufficient to have either w2 > w1 or to have a strict inequality in
Assumption 1. In other words, health expenditures of the type 1 individual ought to
be subsidized at the margin. Most significantly, the use of this instrument improves
over the situation where only income taxation is used. This result is intuitively quite
appealing. In our setting health expenditures are an effective way of redistributing
from the productive and healthy to the less productive and less healthy. As usual in
optimal tax model, redistribution is limited by self-selection and we have to find a
form of redistribution which is more attractive to type 1 individuals than to type 2
individual (who considers mimicking type 1). This is exactly what the subsidization of
H achieves, for the willingness to pay for H of a type 1 individuals is higher than that
10Recall that RH < 0 so that R2H(z1, H1) ≤ R1H(z1, H1) implies R2H(z1,H1)/R1H(z1,H1) ≤ 1.
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of a mimicking type 2 individual. Observe that the special case where MRS1cH = 1
occurs when w2 = w1 and R2H(z
1,H1) = R1H(z
1,H1). In this case, individual 1 and 2
indifference curves in the (c,H) space have the same slope so that a distortion cannot
relax an otherwise binding self-selection constraint.
We now turn to the tradeoff between health and retirement age. Not surprisingly,
there is no distortion for individuals 2. To see this, combine (13) and (15) to show
MRS2Hz = y
2 which, along with (9), implies θ2 = 0. Turning to individual 1, combining
(16) and (14) , we have
MRS1Hz =
f1 − λMRS
2
cH
MRS1cH
f1 − λMRS
2
cz
MRS1cz
y1, (21)
where
MRS
2
cz
MRS1cz
=
V
µ_
l
2
¶
R2z(z
1,H1)
V (l1)R1z(z1,H1)
, (22)
while MRS
2
cH/MRS
1
cH continues to be given by (20). Rearranging the RHS of (21)
while using (22), (20) and defining εiz and ε
i
H as individual i’s (i = 1, 2) elasticity of R
with respect to z and H respectively:
εiz =
Riz (z,H) z
Ri(z,H)
εiH =
RiH (z,H)H
Ri(z,H)
, (23)
yields:
MRS1Hz T y1 ⇔
ε1z
ε2z
S ε
1
H
ε2H
,
which from (9) implies
θ1 S 0⇔ ε
1
z
ε2z
S ε
1
H
ε2H
.
Consequently, the (H, z) tradeoff is distorted upward (θ < 0) when the elasticity of
disutility for health dominates the one of retirement i.e., when ε1z/ε
2
z < ε
1
H/ε
2
H .
To understand this result, let us return to Figure 1 which illustrates an individual’s
choice of (z,H). Recall that for a given pair (y, I) maximizing utility is equivalent to
minimizing R. If ε1z/ε
2
z < ε
1
H/ε
2
H , the slope of the R curve at any given point (z,H)
is smaller for individual 1 than for individual 2. This implies that individual 1 prefers
10
relatively more health than individual 2 for a given (y, I) pair. In other words, the (z,H)
pair chosen by individual 1 lies to the north east of the point chosen by individual 2 on
the life cycle income line H = I + zy. Consequently, the self-selection constraint can be
relaxed by distorting individual 1’s (z,H) tradeoff towards higher health expenditures
and a longer career. In the opposite case, when ε1z/ε
2
z > ε
1
H/ε
2
H , the (z,H) pair chosen
by individual 1 lies to the south west of the point chosen by individual 2. Then, the
way to relax the self selection constraint is to induce individuals 1 to distort their (z,H)
tradeoff toward shorter career and lower health expenditures.
4 Publicly observable anonymous transactions
4.1 Policy instruments and individual choices
We now assume that individual levels of H are not publicly observable. Consequently,
the non-linear subsidy considered in the previous section is no longer feasible. What
is available is information on anonymous transactions so that a linear subsidy (or tax)
on H remains feasible. We characterize the utilitarian allocation that is constrained by
both the standard self-selection constraint and the linearity of the subsidy on health
services. To do this, we characterize an optimal revelation mechanism which consists of
a set of type specific bundles of after tax and before tax incomes and retirement ages
(Di, yi, zi), i = 1, 2, and of the subsidy rate, or equivalently the consumer price of H
(same for everyone), p. A complete solution to the optimal tax problem then requires
only the design of an implementing general income tax function.11
To proceed further, it is necessary to consider the optimization problem of an in-
dividual for a given mechanism (p,Di, yi, zi). This is necessitated by the fact that the
mechanism determines individual consumption of health service only indirectly, namely
through their (consumer) price. Individuals demand for health services Hi(p,D, y, z) is
determined by solving
Max
H
u(D − pH)− V ( y
w
)R(z,H). (24)
11For consistency, it is assumed that individual consumption levels of the numeraire good ci are not
observable either. This is because the budget constraint implies ci = Di − pHi so that when ci is
observable (and with Di set by the government), Hi would effectively be known.
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The first-order condition is given by
−pu0(c)− V (l)RH(z,H) = 0. (25)
The following lemma, established in the appendix, will be useful to study the second
best solution:
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1 we have for any given vector of parameters (p,D, y, z)
H2(p,D, y, z) ≤ H1(p,D, y, z).
In words, this lemma states that at any given point, i.e., when all observable variables
(pre-tax income, after-tax income, retirement age and price of health services) are set
at the same level, then type 2 individuals consume less health services than type 1
individuals. Observe that the inequality is strict when w2 > w1 or when Assumption 1
holds with strict inequality.
4.2 Second best optimum
The utilitarian second best solution is determined by solving the following problem
max
Di,yi,zi,p
X
i
f i
·
u
¡
Di − pHi
¡¡
p,Di, yi, zi
¢¢¢
− V
µ
yi
wi
¶
Ri
¡
zi,Hi
¡
p,Di, yi, zi
¢¢¸
+µ
"X
f i
i
¡
yizi −Di + (p− 1)Hi(p,Di, yi, zi
¢#
+λ
·
u
¡
D2 − pH2
¡
p,D2, y2, z2
¢¢
− V
µ
y2
w2
¶
R2
¡
z2,H2
¡
p,D2, y2, z2
¢¢
−u
¡
D1 − pH2
¡
p,D1, y1, z1
¢¢
+ V
µ
y1
w2
¶
R2
¡
z1,H2
¡
p,D1, y1, z1
¢¢¸
. (26)
This problem differs from the specification in the non linear case (11) in that Hi are
controlled only indirectly. This has the most crucial impact on the self-selection con-
straint in that the mimicking individual no longer has the same consumption vector
as the mimicked individual. Denoting H
2
= H2
¡
p,D1, y1, z1
¢
and c2 = D1 − pH2,
the consumption levels of the mimicking individual, and using the envelop theorem to
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differentiate the (indirect) utility levels in the incentive constraint, FOC with respect
to D1,D2 and p are given by
f1u0
¡
c1
¢
+ µf1
£
(p− 1)H1D − 1
¤
− λu0
¡
c2
¢
= 0, (27)
f2u0
¡
c2
¢
+ µf2
£
(p− 1)H2D − 1
¤
+ λu0
¡
c2
¢
= 0, (28)
−
X
i
f iu0
¡
ci
¢
Hi + µ
X
i
f i
£
Hi + (p− 1)Hip
¤
+ λ
h
H
2
u0
¡
c2
¢
−H2u0
¡
c2
¢i
= 0, (29)
Combining these first order conditions yields the following expression for the optimal
subsidy rate on health expenditures12
p− 1 =


λu0
¡
c2
¢ ³
H1 −H2
´
µ
P
i
eHip

 (30)
where eHip < 0 is the derivative with respect to p of the compensated (Hicksian) demand
for Hi.
The denominator measures the efficiency cost (deadweight loss) associated with a
(positive or negative) subsidy on health. Health is subsidized, p < 1 ifH1(p,D1, y1, z1) >
H2
¡
p,D1, y1, z1
¢
= H
2
, i.e., when the mimicked individual 1 has a larger demand of
H than the mimicker. This is the usual condition (see, e.g., Cremer et al. (2001)) for
the desirability of (positive or negative) commodity taxation. The nice feature in our
setting is that from Lemma 1, we know that under Assumption 1 we necessarily have
p ≤ 1. Furthermore, when w2 > w1 or when Assumption 1 holds with strict inequality,
we have necessarily a subsidy on health expenditures p < 1.13 Observe that unlike in the
previous section this subsidy is now given to all individuals. Needless to say that this
allocation yields a lower level of welfare than the one achieved when individual levels of
H are observable.
5 Public provision of health services
So far we have concentrated on linear or nonlinear subsidies on health expenditures. We
have shown that under plausible conditions such subsidies are part of the optimal policy
12To obtain (30) we sum up equation (29) with equation (27) times H1 and equation (28) times H2
and then solve with respect to p.
13We get p=1 when w1 = w2 and R1H (z,H) = R2H (z,H)
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mix. They constitute a useful instrument even when there is a well designed nonlinear
income tax. In addition to subsidies, public provision of health services is a widespread
form of government intervention in the health sector. Put differently, health services
are often provided in-kind rather than through subsidization of market provision. We
shall now examine if this additional instrument can be useful in our setting. Again we
restrict our attention to health service as reducing the difficulty of working long.
The answer depends first and foremost on the information structure. When nonlinear
subsidies are feasible as in section 3, there is of course no room for further welfare
improvements through public provision; see Cremer and Gahvari (1997) for a detailed
discussion. Any Pareto efficient self selection allocation is readily implementable through
the tax and subsidy system. Consequently, there is no role for in kind transfers in that
setting.
When only anonymous transactions are observable (so that subsidies are restricted
to be linear), we can no longer rule out in-kind transfers on an a priori basis. Assuming
that publicly provided health services cannot be traded on a secondary market, in-kind
transfers of health services do provide partial information on individual consumption
levels. This extra information can potentially be welfare improving.
Public provision can potential be uniform or non uniform (as long as the self-selection
constraints are satisfied). He we shall concentrate on uniform public provision which is
the simplest form. We shall examine whether providing g units of H “free of charge”
(i.e., financed by a uniform lump-sum tax equal to pg) to everyone can bring about a
welfare improvement. The benchmark scenario we use is the optimal solution in Section
4 (optimal non linear income tax and linear subsidy).
Our analysis is closely inspired by Cremer and Gahvari (1997) who show that under
a condition on the relative consumption levels of the different types (including the
mimicker), uniform public provision can relax an otherwise binding incentive constraint
and hence be welfare improving. In our context, Cremer and Gahvari’s Condition 1
writes as
H2
¡
p,D1, y1, z1
¢
= H
2
< min[H1(p,D1, y1, z1),H2(p,D2, y2, z2)]. (31)
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In words, the (hypothetical) consumption level of the mimicking individualH
2
is smaller
than the actual consumption levels of both types of individuals. We know from Lemma
1 that H
2
< H1(p,D1, y1, z1) hold when Assumption 1 is satisfied with strict inequality.
Condition (31) then reduces to
H
2
< H2(p,D2, y2, z2). (32)
This condition says that individual 2’s consumption of health services must be smaller
when he mimics individual 1, than when he chooses his own consumption bundle. In-
tuitively, one would expect this condition to be satisfied. Assuming that (D2, y2, z2) >
(D1, y1, z1) is satisfied the mimicking individual retires earlier, works less and has a
lower disposable income than individual 2. If H2 is an increasing function of its last
three arguments, these three factors then contribute to lowering the level of health ser-
vices consumed by the mimicking individual. From the first and second order conditions
of an individual’s problem (24), one easily shows that this is indeed the case as long as
RHz < 0. This condition (which we can also write −RHz > 0) states roughly speaking
that health expenditures are the more “productive” (improving the health status) the
later the individual retires.
Following the result stated by Proposition 3 in Cremer and Gahvari (1997), we can
then conclude that under Assumption 1 and if the solution in Section 4 satisfies (32), a
public provision of health services at level
g = min[H1(p,D1, y1, z1),H2(p,D2, y2, z2)]− ε, (33)
with ε > 0 and sufficiently small to ensure g > H
2
, along with a suitable adjustment in
the tax policy, is welfare improving.
To understand the intuition behind this result, assume first that the g units of health
services specified by (33) are financed by a uniform lump sum tax at level pg. Then,
the policy has no impact on actual consumption levels. Consequently, it has no effect
on individual utilities and no effect on tax revenue. However, it relaxes the otherwise
binding incentive constraint because it imposes a higher than desired level of health
expenditures on the mimicker. With the incentive constraint no longer binding, it is
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then possible to adjust the tax policy to bring about an increase in welfare. Roughly
speaking this means that some additional redistribution can be achieved and that we
move closer to the first-best solution.
6 Conclusion
We have studied the design of pension benefits and contributions when an individual’s
health status (disutility of continued activity) is endogenous and depends on his con-
sumption of health services. Health services were assumed to be privately provided
but could be subsidized (in a linear or non linear way, depending on the information
structure). In addition, uniform public provision of health services has been considered
as an additional policy instrument, to supplement the optimal subsidy (if any). The
following main results were obtained. First, the result obtained in our earlier papers
under the assumption of an exogenous health status were shown to be robust in the
sense that they continue to hold when the health status is endogenous and depends
on the consumption of health services. In particular, the existence of redistributive
objectives under asymmetric information continues to call for pension benefit formulas
which induce early retirement (at least for some types of individual). Second, whatever
the specific information structure considered (individual levels or anonymous transac-
tions) for health services, a subsidization of health expenditures was shown to obtain
under fairly plausible assumptions. Third, when the information structure permits only
linear subsidies, the case for uniform public provision of health services (which can be
supplemented but not resold) has appeared to be quite strong.
The model used in this paper deals with the issue of retirement and health at the
time of retirement. It could be used in other settings where individuals can influence
the level of a characteristic that is not publicly observable; for instance, the disutility
of “daily” labor or the earning capacity.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Rewrite Ri (z,H) as R
¡
z,H, αi
¢
with dR/dαi > 0 so that individual 1 with bad health is
characterized by α1 ≥ α2. Note that Assumption 1 ensures that −dRH
¡
z,H, αi
¢
/dαi >
0. The FOC (25) can be rewritten as:
−pu0 (D − pH)− V
³ y
w
´
R (z,H, α) = 0 (34)
where subscripts have been deleted.
This equation defines Hi(p,D, y, z) = H
¡
wi, αi; p,D, y, z
¢
with derivatives:
∂H
∂w
= −
y
w2V
0 ¡ y
w
¢
RH (z,H, α)
∆
∂H
∂α
=
V
¡ y
w
¢ ∂RH(z,H,α)
∂α
∆
,
where ∆ < 0 is the second order derivative of the left hand side of (34) with respect
to H. Consequently, we have ∂H/∂w < 0 and ∂H/∂α > 0 so that H2 (p,D, y, z) ≤
H1 (p,D, y, z).
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